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Special Operations Bill passed after Senate deadlock

25 September 2026
This content originally appeared on Trinidad Guardian.
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Con­cerns are mount­ing over the prece­dent that could be es­tab­lished if Sen­ate Pres­i­dent Wade Mark’s use of his cast­ing vote to pass the Gov­ern­ment’s Spe­cial Op­er­a­tions Bill be­comes ac­cept­ed prac­tice when­ev­er Sen­ate votes are tied.

For­mer house speak­er Nizam Mo­hammed weighed in on the is­sue yes­ter­day, fol­low­ing Mark’s de­ci­sion to cast the de­cid­ing vote af­ter Gov­ern­ment sen­a­tors and a com­bined Op­po­si­tion and In­de­pen­dent bloc were dead­locked 15-15 on the bill. Op­po­si­tion sen­a­tors, who chal­lenged Mark’s ac­tion, sub­se­quent­ly walked out of the Sen­ate cham­ber.

While ac­knowl­edg­ing the Sen­ate Pres­i­dent has an un­ques­tion­able con­sti­tu­tion­al right to cast a vote in the event of a tie, Mo­hammed ar­gued that the is­sue ex­tends be­yond the ex­is­tence of that pow­er.

“Mr Mark should pub­lish the find­ings of the re­search on which he act­ed,” Mo­hammed said.

He stressed that par­lia­men­tary con­ven­tions ex­ist to en­sure a cast­ing vote is ex­er­cised con­sis­tent­ly with the in­de­pen­dence and im­par­tial­i­ty of the Chair, rather than serv­ing as a mech­a­nism for ei­ther side to se­cure a ma­jor­i­ty it could not oth­er­wise ob­tain.

“Where pos­si­ble, the Chair should per­mit fur­ther con­sid­er­a­tion. Where a fi­nal de­ci­sion must be made, a sub­stan­tive change should not be ef­fect­ed with­out a ma­jor­i­ty, and an amend­ment to a bill should or­di­nar­i­ly leave the bill in its ex­ist­ing form,” Mo­hammed said.

He added: “The un­der­ly­ing prin­ci­ple is that the pre­sid­ing of­fi­cer should not take re­spon­si­bil­i­ty, by a sin­gle vote, for pro­duc­ing a change which the House it­self has been un­able to ap­prove by a ma­jor­i­ty. The is­sue here is what the of­fice re­quires of the per­son ex­er­cis­ing that pow­er when the Sen­ate it­self has failed to pro­duce a ma­jor­i­ty.”

Point­ing to Sen­ate prece­dent, Mo­hammed said his­tor­i­cal re­search would re­veal re­peat­ed 15-15 di­vi­sions in which gov­ern­ment pro­pos­als were de­feat­ed and sub­stan­tive mo­tions were not car­ried, there­by pre­serv­ing the sta­tus quo.

“If all nine In­de­pen­dent sen­a­tors and all six Op­po­si­tion sen­a­tors de­cline to sup­port a mea­sure, the Gov­ern­ment has failed to se­cure a ma­jor­i­ty among sen­a­tors. The cast­ing vote should not be­come an au­to­mat­ic six­teenth Gov­ern­ment vote which cures that fail­ure,” he said.

“To treat it in that way would fun­da­men­tal­ly al­ter the role of the Chair and di­min­ish the very de­lib­er­a­tive func­tion which the Sen­ate’s com­po­si­tion fa­cil­i­tates.”

Mo­hammed ar­gued that the is­sue is par­tic­u­lar­ly sig­nif­i­cant when sub­stan­tive and con­se­quen­tial leg­is­la­tion is be­fore Par­lia­ment.

“West­min­ster prac­tice recog­nis­es a dis­tinc­tion be­tween keep­ing a mat­ter alive for fur­ther con­sid­er­a­tion and us­ing the cast­ing vote to bring about a fi­nal change in the law. Where no fur­ther dis­cus­sion is pos­si­ble, the long­stand­ing prin­ci­ple is that the change should com­mand a ma­jor­i­ty rather than de­pend up­on the sin­gle vote of the pre­sid­ing of­fi­cer,” he said.

He warned that the im­pli­ca­tions ex­tend far be­yond yes­ter­day’s vote.

“It is the prece­dent that may now be cre­at­ed. If it be­comes ac­cept­ed that when­ev­er the Gov­ern­ment finds it­self at 15-15, the Sen­ate Pres­i­dent may sim­ply pro­vide the six­teenth vote re­quired for pas­sage, the cast­ing vote ceas­es to be an ex­cep­tion­al con­sti­tu­tion­al mech­a­nism ex­er­cised with re­straint and be­comes part of the Gov­ern­ment’s leg­isla­tive arith­metic,” he said.

“That’s pre­cise­ly what must be guard­ed against. Con­sti­tu­tion­al con­ven­tions mat­ter be­cause writ­ten con­sti­tu­tions can­not pre­scribe every re­straint re­quired of those who hold high of­fice. The sys­tem de­pends up­on judg­ment, in­de­pen­dence and an un­der­stand­ing that pos­sess­ing a pow­er is not the same thing as be­ing free from prin­ci­ples gov­ern­ing its ex­er­cise.”

Mo­hammed said the Sen­ate’s com­po­si­tion places a pre­mi­um on de­lib­er­a­tion, per­sua­sion and com­pro­mise.

“Where the num­bers are even­ly di­vid­ed, leg­is­la­tion can­not sim­ply ad­vance by force of num­bers. It re­quires fuller de­bate, greater en­gage­ment with op­pos­ing views and, where nec­es­sary, ad­just­ment suf­fi­cient to se­cure a gen­uine ma­jor­i­ty in the Sen­ate. That’s why a 15-15 di­vi­sion should cause us to pay at­ten­tion.”

Mo­hammed al­so cit­ed Er­sk­ine May: Par­lia­men­tary Prac­tice, wide­ly re­gard­ed as the au­thor­i­ta­tive guide to West­min­ster par­lia­men­tary pro­ce­dure. The text states that while pre­sid­ing of­fi­cers are en­ti­tled to cast a de­cid­ing vote when di­vi­sions are tied, long­stand­ing con­ven­tions have de­vel­oped to pro­tect the im­par­tial­i­ty of the Chair.

Those con­ven­tions rest on three core prin­ci­ples:

Vote for fur­ther dis­cus­sion: Where pos­si­ble, the Chair should cast a vote that al­lows con­tin­ued de­bate and con­sid­er­a­tion.

Ma­jor de­ci­sions re­quire a ma­jor­i­ty: Where no fur­ther dis­cus­sion is pos­si­ble and a vote would pro­duce a fi­nal de­ci­sion, sig­nif­i­cant changes should be ap­proved by an ac­tu­al ma­jor­i­ty of mem­bers rather than by the cast­ing vote of the pre­sid­ing of­fi­cer alone.

Pre­serve the ex­ist­ing text: On amend­ments to bills or mo­tions, the cast­ing vote should be ex­er­cised in a man­ner that leaves the ex­ist­ing word­ing un­changed un­less a ma­jor­i­ty sup­ports the al­ter­ation.

Mo­hammed ar­gued that these prin­ci­ples are de­signed to en­sure that dis­put­ed po­lit­i­cal de­ci­sions are ul­ti­mate­ly made by elect­ed and ap­point­ed leg­is­la­tors, rather than by the pre­sid­ing of­fi­cer act­ing alone.