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Trump-Xi summit comes with high stakes for Taiwan, the island democracy that China claims as its own

11 May 2026
This content originally appeared on Trinidad Guardian.
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Pres­i­dent Don­ald Trump, in his re­turn to the White House, has demon­strat­ed greater am­biva­lence to­ward Tai­wan, an ap­proach that’s rais­ing ques­tions ahead of this week’s sum­mit with Chi­nese Pres­i­dent Xi Jin­ping about whether the U.S. leader could be open to di­alling back sup­port for the is­land democ­ra­cy that Bei­jing views as its break­away province.

Trump in De­cem­ber au­tho­rized an $11 bil­lion arms pack­age for Tai­wan — the largest weapons sale ever to the is­land — but has not yet moved for­ward with de­liv­ery and even ac­knowl­edged that he’s dis­cussed the sale with Xi. He’s groused that Tai­wan “stole” Amer­i­ca’s semi­con­duc­tor busi­ness and called on Tai­wan to pay the U.S. for pro­tec­tion.

All the while, Trump has, with the threat of hefty tar­iffs, prod­ded Taipei to agree to mas­sive in­vest­ments in U.S. semi­con­duc­tor man­u­fac­tur­ing and to pur­chase bil­lions of dol­lars’ worth of U.S. liq­ue­fied nat­ur­al gas and crude oil.

Trump’s rhetoric is fu­elling spec­u­la­tion in Bei­jing, Taipei and Wash­ing­ton about Amer­i­ca’s com­mit­ment to help the is­land de­fend it­self and whether the Re­pub­li­can pres­i­dent could be per­suad­ed to cede ground on the long-stand­ing U.S. pos­ture to­ward the is­land.

Tai­wan’s back­ers are con­cerned that Taipei will be “on the menu” when Trump and Xi sit down for talks, said re­tired U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mark Mont­gomery.

“I do wor­ry that we have a trans­ac­tion­al pres­i­dent and a trans­ac­tion­al op­por­tu­ni­ty could arise, and then we would have a chal­lenge,” said Mont­gomery, now with the Foun­da­tion for De­fense of Democ­ra­cies, a Wash­ing­ton think tank that sup­ports ro­bust U.S. back­ing of Tai­wan.

Ru­bio says US pol­i­cy is un­changed

The Chi­nese have sig­nalled they in­tend to make Tai­wan a cen­tral part of the talks be­tween Xi and Trump this week. Chi­nese For­eign Min­is­ter Wang Yi raised Tai­wan dur­ing a call with Sec­re­tary of State Mar­co Ru­bio to pre­pare for the trip and urged the Unit­ed States to “make the right choic­es” about its poli­cies to­ward the is­land in or­der to safe­guard “sta­bil­i­ty” be­tween the two na­tions, ac­cord­ing to a state­ment by the Chi­nese For­eign Min­istry.

But Ru­bio said U.S. pol­i­cy has not changed. “We don’t want to see any forced or com­pelled change in the sit­u­a­tion,” he told re­porters in Rome on Fri­day, say­ing it “would be desta­bi­liz­ing to the world.” He not­ed that Tai­wan would not be “a fea­ture of our trip, but it’ll cer­tain­ly be an item that’s dis­cussed.”

White House of­fi­cials have un­der­scored that Trump, who al­so ap­proved $330 mil­lion in air­craft parts for Tai­wan’s mil­i­tary in No­vem­ber, has al­ready ap­proved more in mil­i­tary sales for Tai­wan in the first year of his sec­ond term than the rough­ly $8.4 bil­lion that De­mo­c­ra­t­ic Pres­i­dent Joe Biden ap­proved over his four years in of­fice.

Tai­wan has been un­der pres­sure from the Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion to in­crease its de­fence spend­ing, and on Fri­day its law­mak­ers broke months of grid­lock to ap­prove $25 bil­lion in arms pur­chas­es. It was sig­nif­i­cant­ly less than the $40 bil­lion pro­pos­al put for­ward last year by Tai­wan Pres­i­dent Lai Ching-te. A se­nior Trump ad­min­is­tra­tion of­fi­cial, who spoke to re­porters on the con­di­tion of anonymi­ty un­der ground rules set by the White House, said it was dis­ap­point­ing that the par­lia­ment did not ful­ly fund Lai’s pro­pos­al.

Tai­wanese gov­ern­ment of­fi­cials have ex­pressed con­cern about Chi­na’s rhetoric ahead of the sum­mit, though they’ve al­so tak­en some com­fort from Ru­bio’s mea­sured com­ments.

“(Chi­na) may at­tempt some ma­noeu­vring dur­ing the talks, but the U.S. has re­peat­ed­ly re­it­er­at­ed, through both pub­lic and pri­vate chan­nels, that its pol­i­cy to­ward Tai­wan re­mains un­changed,” Na­tion­al Se­cu­ri­ty Bu­reau Di­rec­tor-Gen­er­al Tsai Ming-yen told re­porters.

Xi may look to loosen US-Tai­wan ties

The key ques­tion, Chi­na ex­perts say, is just how far Xi will try to go in his ef­fort to prod Trump clos­er to Bei­jing’s view.

Chi­na sees the self-ruled Tai­wan as a rene­gade province, to be an­nexed by force if nec­es­sary. It pro­hibits coun­tries it has diplo­mat­ic re­la­tions with from hav­ing for­mal ties with Taipei. Since es­tab­lish­ing diplo­mat­ic re­la­tions with mod­ern Chi­na in 1979, the U.S. has man­aged to stay with­in the frame­work of Bei­jing’s de­mands while main­tain­ing in­for­mal sup­port for Tai­wan and pro­vid­ing it with arms.

As part of the U.S. am­bi­gu­i­ty on Tai­wan, Wash­ing­ton ac­knowl­edges Bei­jing’s po­si­tion that Tai­wan is part of Chi­na but does not ex­plic­it­ly en­dorse it. The U.S. has al­so his­tor­i­cal­ly stat­ed it “does not sup­port” Tai­wan’s in­de­pen­dence and op­pos­es uni­lat­er­al changes to the sta­tus quo be­tween Tai­wan and Chi­na.

But an­a­lysts say Xi could seek to per­suade Trump — who al­ready has demon­strat­ed a will­ing­ness to blur the lines of tra­di­tion­al diplo­ma­cy — to loosen ties with Tai­wan through curbs on U.S. arms sales or with in­for­mal lim­its on vis­its by promi­nent U.S. of­fi­cials to the is­land. In Feb­ru­ary, Trump sug­gest­ed he broke from long­stand­ing U.S. pol­i­cy and con­sult­ed with Xi on arms sales to Tai­wan.

“Even if we don’t see some­thing as dra­mat­ic as a for­mal shift in de­clara­to­ry pol­i­cy, this time around, there is al­ways a risk that Pres­i­dent Trump may make an off-the-cuff re­mark giv­en he’s not nec­es­sar­i­ly some­body who ap­pre­ci­ates the nu­ances of long­stand­ing pol­i­cy lan­guage,” said Pa­tri­cia Kim of the As­sess­ing Chi­na Project at Brook­ings In­sti­tu­tion in Wash­ing­ton.

White House sits out Japan-Chi­na rift

A row be­tween U.S. al­ly Japan and Chi­na has al­so raised spec­u­la­tion about the strength of Trump’s com­mit­ment to Tai­wan. In No­vem­ber, Japan­ese Prime Min­is­ter Sanae Takaichi said a Chi­nese at­tack on Tai­wan was of con­cern to the re­gion and could con­sti­tute “a sur­vival-threat­en­ing sit­u­a­tion” for Japan, re­quir­ing the use of force.

Trump made back-to-back calls with Takaichi and Xi that same month, though he’s re­mained large­ly silent about the spat.

“I know they have a lit­tle bit of an edgy re­la­tion­ship,” Trump said as he host­ed Takaichi for talks in March. He added, “I’ll be speak­ing Japan’s prais­es when I’m in Chi­na with Pres­i­dent Xi.”

Ad­di­tion­al­ly, Trump’s back­ing of Tai­wan faced scruti­ny af­ter the 2026 U.S. Na­tion­al De­fense Strat­e­gy omit­ted di­rect men­tion of the is­land.

The best-case sce­nario for Tai­wan

One card Tai­wan holds is its ro­bust semi­con­duc­tor sec­tor, the world’s largest, which the U.S. re­lies on to main­tain an edge in its ad­vanced-tech­nol­o­gy race against Chi­na.

“Trump at the very least re­al­izes the role that Tai­wan plays in the U.S.’s eco­nom­ic growth,” said Lev Nach­man, a po­lit­i­cal sci­ence pro­fes­sor at Na­tion­al Tai­wan Uni­ver­si­ty. “So I think that is sort of the main sil­ver lin­ing in think­ing that noth­ing dras­tic will change in terms of pol­i­cy to­ward Tai­wan.”

While Trump is known for his trans­ac­tion­al na­ture, his ad­min­is­tra­tion has not viewed dif­fi­cult as­pects of the U.S.-Chi­na re­la­tion­ship as “fun­gi­ble” is­sues that can be trad­ed, said Edgard Ka­gan, a for­mer se­nior State De­part­ment of­fi­cial who served un­der Trump and Biden on East Asia pol­i­cy is­sues.

“The pres­i­dent un­der­stands lever­age. My ex­pe­ri­ence of be­ing in meet­ings with him, he has a very, very acute sense of how to use it,” said Ka­gan, who is now the Chi­na Stud­ies chair at the Cen­ter for Strate­gic and In­ter­na­tion­al Stud­ies in Wash­ing­ton. “And so I think that the idea that there’s go­ing to be a trade where the pres­i­dent sort of sac­ri­fices U.S. in­ter­ests in Tai­wan in or­der to get oth­er things — I think it’s un­like­ly based on my own ex­pe­ri­ence of how he op­er­ates.”

In the end, whether the is­land comes out of the Xi-Trump sum­mit on a stronger or weak­er foot­ing will like­ly be judged by the lead­ers’ pub­lic state­ments.

Af­ter his last face-to-face en­counter with Xi in Oc­to­ber, Trump claimed that Xi hadn’t broached the is­sue and that Chi­nese of­fi­cials “know the con­se­quences” of tak­ing mil­i­tary ac­tion against Tai­wan.

“I think the best-case sce­nario Tai­wan can hope for is that Tai­wan is not talked about pub­licly or, at the very least, in a min­i­mal way,” Nach­man said. —WASH­ING­TON (AP)

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Sto­ry by AAMER MAD­HANI and SIM­I­NA MIS­TRE­ANU | As­so­ci­at­ed Press

Sim­i­na Mis­tre­anu re­port­ed from Taipei. As­so­ci­at­ed Press writer Gi­a­da Zam­pano in Rome con­tributed to this re­port.