How US-Iran war may push Gulf countries to ‘diversify’ security alliances 

Gulf countries are likely to accelerate the push to diversify their security partnerships after the United States-Israel war on Iran, analysts say, as the region grapples with the lasting impact of the conflict.

As Tehran and Washington hold talks towards a lasting agreement, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – which came under Iranian attack during the war – are expanding their relationships amid the uncertainty.

Even before the war, Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact with Pakistan, an alliance that could expand to other countries in the region.

For years, Gulf states have been buying defence systems from some European countries, while maintaining friendly relations with Russia and China – an approach that will likely be cemented by the conflict, experts say.

Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, stressed that seeking new security partners is not aimed at replacing the US.

“The focus for countries like Saudi Arabia is the regional balance of power and pushing back on both Iran and Israel,” Jacobs Khalaf told Al Jazeera.

“This doesn’t mean replacing the US with Pakistan; it means diversifying partnerships and setting up platforms like the so-called quad group of Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Egypt and Pakistan. It also means developing their own domestic defensive capabilities and developing more regional autonomy.”

Iranian attacks

Since the war broke out on February 28, Iranian attacks have targeted military bases hosting US troops as well as some civilian sites, including airports, energy facilities and hotels in some Gulf countries.

Even after Tehran and Washington reached a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to end the war earlier this month, the Iranian military – spearheaded by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – launched missiles and drones at targets in Bahrain and Kuwait in skirmishes with the US.

Besides Iran, many Gulf countries view Israel’s expansionist policies and military campaigns as a threat as well, analysts say.

Last year, Israel bombed the Qatari capital Doha in an attempt to kill Hamas leaders during US-backed Gaza ceasefire mediations.

President Donald Trump said he was “very unhappy” with the strikes on Qatar – a major non-NATO ally of the US – and denied approving or having prior knowledge of the attack.

Jacobs Khalaf said the decision by the US and Israel to attack Iran and Tehran’s retaliation against the Arabian Peninsula, which saw Iranian forces shut down the Strait of Hormuz, created an “unprecedented security crisis” for GCC members.

“The US and Israeli war on Iran and its hugely negative impact on Gulf states has convinced some regional capitals that they want to shift away from a US-centric security architecture,” she told Al Jazeera.

“The Iran war is making some Gulf states question the value of the US as a security guarantor.”

Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, also said that GCC countries will likely look to “diversify” their security alliances and deepen ties with China, Turkiye and Europe.

“I suspect that the Gulf will want to maintain its security relationship with the United States, but that it will no longer want to be in a position where it is relying on the United States,” Sheline told Al Jazeera.

She added that US forces in the region not only proved “unreliable” in preventing Iran’s attacks, but “actually, the presence of the US military in Gulf countries had the opposite of a deterrent effect. These military bases became targets,” Sheline said.

Mending ties with Iran

Despite the anger over the Iranian attacks, Gulf countries have kept lines of communication open with Tehran, even at the security level.

Several GCC countries are moving to mend ties and deepen economic relations with their neighbour across the Gulf.

Investments may prove a more effective deterrent than weapons, some experts suggest.

If Gulf and Iranian economic interests are intertwined, Tehran would think twice before striking the region, Sheline explained.

“Gulf states are likely to try a different approach, whereby they try to make it more costly for Iran to strike them in the future by tying themselves more closely to Iran, such as through electricity infrastructure,” she said.

US Vice President JD Vance alluded to that strategy in a recent interview with UnHerd, underscoring that Gulf countries have welcomed the MoU between Washington and Tehran.

“The Emiratis — by far the most hawkish, by far the most pro-Israel country in the [Gulf Cooperation Council] — they’re having conversations with the Iranians that have never happened before, including with the IRGC, about various types of economic incentives — ‘Here’s what we’d need to see to make your country investable’ — and the Iranians come back and say, ‘OK, yeah, we’re willing to do all those things’,” Vance said last week.

US-Israel calculations

The US itself appears to be at a crossroads with its posture in the region.

Last year, Trump’s National Security Strategy emphasised that Washington no longer views the Middle East as a geopolitical priority, arguing that foreign policy resources must shift away from the region to more pressing areas – namely the Western Hemisphere.

At the same time, the US has a longstanding political and security commitment to Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has refused to abide by the MoU’s demands for a regional ceasefire, including in Lebanon.

Almost as soon as the MoU was signed, Israel’s allies in Washington, DC, mobilised against diplomacy and stressed the need to allow Israel to continue its military campaigns in Lebanon and across the region.

Trump’s team pushed back against some of the criticism.

“The Israelis and the United States, we have a lot of shared interests, but we also have some situations where our interests diverge,” Vance told Fox News earlier this month.

Nonetheless, the Trump administration has backed a separate agreement between Lebanon and Israel that practically gives Israel freedom of action in Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms, which appears to be at odds with the first line of the MoU’s call for a ceasefire.

Some of Netanyahu’s right-wing allies have openly opposed the MoU. However, the Israeli prime minister has struck a balance between repeatedly thanking Trump for the war with Iran. while also stressing that Israel will continue to pursue its own policies in Lebanon and beyond.

Sheline said if the ceasefire deal leads to a comprehensive agreement with Iran, the US may finally be able to step away from the Middle East, but Israel may act as a spoiler to keep tensions going and pull the US back into fighting in the region.

“The big question mark is Israel,” she said.

Sheline added that if the US pressures Israel to prevent the Netanyahu government from torpedoing the deal, Washington could take a step back and allow “regional countries to take greater responsibility for their own security in a way that is much more sustainable”.

For the Gulf, Israel’s militarism has been seen increasingly as a threat to the entire Middle East, especially after the 2025 Doha attack and the war with Iran.

“Many Gulf states feel very threatened by Israel’s increasingly aggressive posture in the region,” said Jacobs Khalaf.

“Israel’s destruction in Gaza since October 7, its entrenching and expanding occupation of Palestinian lands and its attacks on both Lebanon and Syrian territory are hugely threatening and unacceptable to all the Gulf states, even those that have normalised relations with Israel.”